UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

9-3-2008

Rhoades v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
34236

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Rhoades v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 34236" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1924.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1924

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PAUL EZRA RHOADES,
Petitioner/Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 34236

FILED~ COPY

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR BONNEVILLE COUNTY
HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING PRESIDING

DENNIS BENJAMIN

L. LAMONT ANDERSON

Idaho Bar #4199
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701-2772
Telephone: 208-343-1000
Facsimile: 208-345-8274

Office of the Idaho Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone:
208-334-4542
Facsimile:
208-334-2942

Attorney for Petitioner Paul E. Rhoades

Attorney for Respondent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................... i
BACKGROUND ............................................................ iii
ARGUMENT ................................................................ 1
THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CHARGING
PETITIONER WITH THE DUTY TO VERIFY THAT THE PROSECUTION
DID NOT OBTAIN HIS CONVICTION THROUGH DECEIT VIA AN EXPERT
WITNESS ................................................................... 1

I.

The Court Below Abused Its Discretion In Denying Petitioner's
Motion To Amend Proposed Count Two's Claims Into The Petition
On The Ground That Petitioner Could Have Consulted With Au
Expert At Time He Filed The Original Post-Conviction Petition In
This Action. Denying Legal Recourse To Petitioner For The
Prosecution's Egregious Misconduct Violated Petitioner's Rights
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); The Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States
Constitution; Article I, Sections 6 (Cruel And Unusual Punishment
Prohibited) And 13 (Due Process Guaranteed) Of The Idaho
Constitution; As Well As Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P.3d
636, 642 (2000) ......................................................... 1
A.

Petitioner's Proposed Amendments Met The Pleading
Requirements Of Section 19-2719(5) ................................. 2
1.

Petitioner could not reasonably have known that the
prosecution elicited but failed to correct its forensic
expert's false testimony or that the FBl's more refined
-as compared to the state crime lab's-serological testing
established his actual innocence ............................... 2

2.

Neither of the proposed amendments alleged matters
that were cumulative or impeaching ........................... 6

3.

To the extent that Section 19-2719 penalizes
post-conviction petitioners for presuming that

prosecutors fully discharge their constitutional
obligations, including not knowingly eliciting false
testimony and correcting any false testimony which
they do elicit and which they know or should know
is false, it violates Petitioner's state and federal
constitutional rights to due process ............................ 6
B.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) Violates the Idaho Constitution
Separation of Powers Requirement .................................. 7

II.

THE TWO CLAIMS WHICH THE LOWER COURT DECLINED
TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO AMEND INTO HIS PETITION
WERE VIABLE, NOT FUTILE .......................................... 8

III.

PETITIONER'S ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS:
FREE-STANDING ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS ARE
COGNIZABLE AND PETITIONER HAS CLEARLY MADE
OUT A GATEWAY INNOCENCE CLAIM ................................ 10
A.

Federal And State Free-Standing Innocence Claims Are
Cognizable •.................................................... 10

B.

Petitioner Has Made Out A Gateway Claim Oflnnocence .............. 11

CONCLUSION •...........................................................• 16

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) .................................................................. 15
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S.123 (1968) .................................................................. 15
Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S.186 (1987) .......................................................................... 15
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) ...................................................................... 11,12,13
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) ............................................................................ 11
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) .............................................................................. 12
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) .......................................................................... 4

STATE CASES

Black Canyon Racquetball v. First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900
(1991) ........................................................................................................................ 10
Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,243 P.2d 303 (Idaho 1952) ................... 9
Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251,239 P.2d 266 (Idaho 1951) ........................................ 9
Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516,975 P.2d I 181 (Ct.App. 1999) ........................................ 12
McKinneyv. State, 133 Idaho 695,992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999) ....................................... 6
McKnight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629, 92 P. 989 (Idaho 1907) ..... .... ..... ... ... .. .. ...................... 9
Paradis v. State, l 10 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (Idaho 1986) ......................................... 8
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, JO P.3d 742 (Idaho 2000) .............................................. 5
Robinsonv. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122,212 P.2d 1031 (Idaho 1949) .................................. 9
Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000) .............................................. 4,5,8
State v. Hays, 144 Idaho 574, 165 P.3d 288 (Ct.App. 2007) ............................................. 7

State v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 300 P.2d 491 (Idaho 1956) ............................ 8
State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63,822 P.2d 960 (Idaho 1991) .......................................... 14

FEDERAL STATUTES

U.S. Const. Amend. VI, XIV ............................................................................................ 8

ST ATE ST ATUTES
Idaho Const. art. I, §13 ................................................................................................. 8,12
Idaho Const., art. 2, § 1 ................................................................................................... 3,8
Idaho Const., art. 5, §13 ............................................................................................... 3,8,9
Idaho Const. art. 5,§20 ....................................................................................................... 9

11

BACKGROUND
In 2002, Petitioner filed in district court his post-conviction petition seeking to conduct
DNA testing on still extant forensic evidence form the investigation into the murder for which he
stands convicted and sentenced to death. R. p.5, et seq. Petitioner later moved to amend two
counts into that petition. R. pp. 106-151. The lower court denied the motion. After Petitioner
withdrew Count One, the lower court dismissed the matter. R. p. 222. This appeal followed.
Petitioner's proposed Count Two alleged prosecutorial misconduct including the
functional equivalent of suborning perjury during the jury trial, to the effect that Petitioner was a
possible contributor of semen removed from the victim. Proposed Count Three alleged that
Petitioner conducted none of the offenses and none of their lesser included offenses. It also
alleged that ifthere was insufficient evidence of actual innocence to wammt his release, there
was sufficient evidence to warrant the courts reaching his otherwise waived claims. As evidence
in support of both proposed counts, Petitioner relied on testing conducted at the prosecution's
request by the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation ("FBI"). The FBI tested swabs used to recover
evidence, which turned out to be semen, from the victim's mouth and vagina. Initially, the
prosecution conducted phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing on those swabs. 1 The prosecution
testing, conducted by the state crime lab, revealed that Petitioner's and the swab's PGM shared
certain features. However, the FBI lab conducted more refined PGM testing. After being
advised that the FBI test results "did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the

1

PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids
containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's particular PGM features. There
are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As noted in the text, the FBI testing was
more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state laboratory.
111

semen[,]" Petitioner moved to amend Counts Two and Three into his petition. R. pp. 123-27
(Affidavit In Support of First Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief at Exhibit 2 (Greg
Hampikian, Ph.D., sworn statement)).

iv

ARGUMENT
THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY CHARGING
PETITIONER WITH THE DUTY TO VERIFY THAT THE PROSECUTION DID
NOT OBTAIN HIS CONVICTION THROUGH DECEIT VIA AN EXPERT WITNESS
Respondent answers Petitioner's Opening Brief with three broad arguments. First,
according to Respondent, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Second,
Respondent argues, the court below did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to
amend two claims into his petition because those claims were futile. Third, Respondent contends
that there is no cognizable state or federal free-standing innocence claim for relief, and that
Petitioner has failed to make out a gateway innocence claim. Each argument fails.

I.

The Court Below Abused Its Discretion In Denying Petitioner's
Motion To Amend Proposed Count Two's Claims Into The Petition
On The Ground That Petitioner Could Have Consulted With An
Expert At Time He Filed The Original Post-Conviction Petition In
This Action. Denying Legal Recourse To Petitioner For The
Prosecution's Egregious Misconduct Violated Petitioner's Rights
Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); The Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States
Constitution; Article I, Sections 6 (Cruel And Unusual Punishment
Prohibited) And 13 (Due Process Guaranteed) Of The Idaho
Constitution; As Well As Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P.3d
636, 64 2 (2000 ).
Respondent claims that this Court has no jurisdiction to consider whether the lower court

abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion to amend two proposed counts into his
petition for post-conviction relief. Respondent's claim fails for two reasons. Summarily stated,
Respondent argues that Section 19-2719(5) sets out certain pleading requirements which must be
met by every successive post-conviction petition, and that same statute also removes from Idaho
courts any "power to consider any such claims for relief' which do not meet those requirements.

Because, Respondent's argument continues, Petitioner did not meet Section 19-2719's pleading
requirements, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. This argument fails, however,
for two reasons. First, Petitioner did meet the pleading requirements of Section 19-2719(5).
Second, even if Petitioner did not meet the Section 19-2719(5) pleading requirements, the
legislature's effort to limit this Court's jurisdiction runs afoul of the Idaho Constitution's
separation of powers requirement. Idaho Const., A1i. 2, §1 & art. 5, §13.
A.

Petitioner's Proposed Amendments Met The Pleading Requirements Of
Section 19-2719(5).

Section 19-2719(5) provides, Respondent correctly notes, that an Idaho court may
consider the merits of a successive post-conviction petition only if the applicant shows that any
issue raised was not known or could not reasonably have been known within the time for filing
his original post-conviction petition. Additionally, Respondent also correctly notes, Section 192719(5) provides that a successive petition "shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it
alleges matters that are cumulative or impeaching[.]" Id. at (5)(b). Contrary to Respondent's
contention, Petitioner's proposed amendments met each of these pleading requirements.

l.

Petitioner could not reasonably have known that the prosecution
elicited but failed to correct its forensic expert's false testimony or
that the FBI's more refined-as compared to the state crime
lab's-serological testing established his actual innocence.

Though Petitioner could have discovered well before filing his motion to amend his
petition the compelling evidence of the prosecuting attorney's flagrant disregard of his ethical
duty to do justice and Petitioner's constitutional rights, it is wrong that Petitioner could
reasonably have discovered it. LC. §19-2719 (3) ("Within forty-two days of the filing of the
judgment imposing the punishment of death, ... the defendant must file any legal or factual
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challenge to the sentence or conviction that is known or reasonably should be known.) & (5) ("If
the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this section and within the time limits
specified, he shall be deemed to have waived such claims for relief as were known, or reasonably
should have been known."). There is a straight-forward reason for this: "Defense attorneys are

entitled to rely on the presumption that prosecutors have fully discharged their official duties,
including the duty to disclose exculpatory material." Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641,648, 8 P.3d
636, 643, reh 'g denied (Idaho 2000) (citing to Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 284-86 (1999).
Yet despite this clear statement of state and federal law, Respondent contends that Petitioner
could and should have retained an expert to review the FBI report "during his first postconviction case to ascertain whether the F.B.I. report was susceptible to a different interpretation
than the opinion provided at trial by the state's experts." Brief at 20. Respondent's contention is
false for two reasons. First, it flies in the face of the state and federal constitutional due process
guarantees to Petitioner that the "prosecutors... fully discharge[] their official duties[.]" Sivak v.
State, 134 Idaho at 648, 8 P.3d at 643. Second, it suggests that Dr. Hampikian's conclusions

regarding the FBI report are mere "opinion."
This Court has never held that post-conviction petitioners must search for prosecutorial
misconduct or waive any such claims which may otherwise be revealed. None of the cases
Respondent cites supports his contention that Petitioner waived his prosecutorial misconduct
claim by failing to seek it out at the time of his initial post-conviction petition. Though it is true
that in the first case, Sivak, the Court held that, "The State's prosecutorial misconduct in allowing
Leytham's false testimony at trial to go uncorrected was an issue which reasonably should have
been known at the time of Sivak's first petition." Brief at 17 (quoting Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho at
3

645.) However, this one sentence comes at the end of the Court's extended discussion
explaining why the issue should have been known at the time ofSivak's first petition. In that
discussion, the Court quotes extensively from a deposition of Mr. Leytham revealing that he had
agreed with the prosecutor to testify against Mr. Sivak in exchange for consideration. Sivak v.

State, 134 Idaho at 648, 8 P.3d at 643. That deposition's availability to defense counsel at the
time of the first post-conviction petition served as the basis for the Court's holding that Mr.
Sivak should reasonably have known about the false trial testimony issue at the time of that first
petition. Respondent's implicit suggestion is, then, wrong that Sivak stands for the proposition
that prosecutorial misconduct claims generally must be raised in an individual's first postconviction petition. Additionally, Respondent's assertion that Dr. Hampikian's review of the
FBI Report is analogous to the Leytham deposition in Sivak misses the critical factual distinction:
Dr. Hampikian's review was not available to Petitioner at the time of his first post-conviction
petition whereas, in Sivak, the Leytham deposition was available at the time of the initial petition.
The analogy Respondent seeks to draw works only assuming that Petitioner was legally obliged
to seek out prosecutorial misconduct at the time he filed his first post-conviction petition.
However, that directly contradicts this Court's holding in Sivak. Supra.
So, too, Respondent wrongly suggests that its second cited case, Pizzuto v. State, 134
Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (Idaho 2000), applies here. While Respondent accurately quotes from

Pizzuto for the proposition that claims of mere impeachment are not cognizable in a successive
post-conviction petition, that general principle has no application in the case at bar. Petitioner's
claim is not that Respondent illegally withheld impeachment evidence, but that it engaged in
affirmative prosecutorial misconduct by misleading the jury.
4

Finally, Respondent's reliance on its third cited case, McKinney, is misplaced. Brief at
17. Indeed, Respondent merely quotes from that decision that, "McKinney has waived the
following issues under LC. § 19-2719 because he either actually knew them, or reasonably should
have known them, at the time he filed his first petition for post-conviction relief." Brief at 17
(quoting McKinney, 133 Idaho at 708,992 P.2d at 157).
The second reason Respondent's contention fails is that Dr. Hampikian's conclusion
regarding the FBI report is not an opinion. On the contrary, a second sworn statement from Dr.
Hampikian was filed to protect against just such an unfortunate misunderstanding. In that second
statement, Dr. Hampikian explains that:
[T]he kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I reached in my
June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally accepted by forensic biologists
and forensic serologists in 1987, it also was a basic tool known to and employed
by forensic experts in investigating offenses where evidence containing body
fluids might help uncover a perpetrators identity. The kind of analysis I employed
using the FBI PGM subtyping test results was, in 1987, on a par with similar uses
of blood typing test results. Indeed, the State crime laboratory letter to the FBI
Laboratory's Forensic Serology Unit requesting PGM subtyping was a standard
and typical request when it was made on June 3, l 987. See Appendix I (State of
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Bureau of Laboratories' senior
Criminalist Ms. Pamela J. Marcum's letter to FBI) .... Ms. Marcum's
correspondence shows clearly that the State of Idaho crime laboratory reflected
the universal acceptance by forensic biologists and forensic serologists of PGM
subtyping and the kind of analysis I conducted to reach the conclusion I arrived at
in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. The results reported by the FBI in its July 13,
1987, letter to Ms. Marcum were clear, unambiguous, and used a standard
reporting language that would be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic
biologist of the day. See appendix 2 (FBI Laboratory report to Ms. Marcum) ...
.This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] from being the donor of the
semen sample found on the victim[.] .. furthermore, there is no indication in the
FBI report that this finding could be an artifact, or that there was any evidence of a
mixture in the sample. The standard and universally accepted conclusion in
1987 (as today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhoades [sic) does not
match the questioned semen sample (Ql) taken from the victim's body. Paul
Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of the semen sample Ql.

5

R. p. 199-202 (emphasis added). Petitioner's proposed amendments met the Section 19-2719
requirement that he did not know or could not have reasonably known the stated claims.

2.

Neither of the proposed amendments alleged matters that were
cumulative or impeaching.

There was no testimony or other evidence at Petitioner's trial to which either proposed
amendment was cumulative. Neither proposed amendment was impeaching. Evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct is not impeachment evidence as it is not "designed to discredit a
witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by bringing forth the evidence which
explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony." State v. Hayes, 144 Idaho
574, 165 P.3d 288, 292 (Ct.App. 2007). Rather, it is evidence that the prosecution engaged in
improper behavior in a way that violated the defendant's right to due process. In the case at bar,
Petitioner alleges, among other things, that the prosecution elicited what it knew or should have
known was false testimony, and that far from taking any corrective steps, the prosecution
exaggerated that false testimony in its closing argument.

3.

To the extent that Section 19-2719 penalizes post-conviction
petitioners for presuming that prosecutors fully discharge their
constitutional obligations, including not knowingly eliciting false
testimony and correcting any false testimony which they do elicit and
which they know or should know is false, it violates Petitioner's state
and federal constitutional rights to due process.

Petitioner is entitled as a matter of state and federal constitutionally guaranteed due
process to the state fully discharging its constitutional obligations, including not knowingly
eliciting false testimony and correcting any false testimony elicited which it knows is false. U.S.
Const. Amend. VI, XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho at 648, 8 P.3d at 643.
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To the extent that Idaho Code Section 19-2719 penalizes Petitioner for presuming that the
prosecuting attorneys and subsequent state representative defending his conviction and death
sentence fully discharged their constitutional obligations, it violates his state and federal
constitutional rights to due process.

B.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) Violates the Idaho Constitution Separation of
Powers Requirement.

Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts,
which the Idaho Constitution provides is "original jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in
equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." By limiting the district
court's jurisdiction, the statute runs afoul of the Idaho Constitution's mandate that the branches
of government maintain separation of powers. That mandate is found in two places in the Idaho
Constitution, article 2, §1, and article 5, §13.
It is settled that a Section 19-2719 proceeding "is a proceeding entirely new and
independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho
534,536, 716 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Idaho 1986). Article V, Sectionl3's mandate that the legislature
"provide a proper system of appeals" does not extend to Section 19-2719 proceedings because
they are not appeals.
This Court has consistently rejected past legislative efforts to restrict the judiciary's
jurisdiction. In State v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 246, 300 P .2d 491, 494 (Idaho 1956),
the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to transform previously criminal matters of
juveniles into civil matters because "[t]he legislature, by denoting as a civil matter what the law
has previously regarded as a felony, attempt[ed] to take away jurisdiction vested in the district

7

court by the constitution itself, and ... attempted to render that court powerless to do anything
about the prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho
441, 444-45, 243 P.2d 303,304 (Idaho 1952), this Court held that "(t]he original jurisdiction
conferred upon the district court by the constitution, Art. 5, §20, cannot be diminished by the
legislature. Const. Art. 5, § 13(.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 Idaho 251, 256-57, 239 P.2d
266, 269 (Idaho 1951 ), the Court held that "[t]he broad jurisdiction [created by Article 5, Section
13] is not subject to diminution by legislative act." The Court held the same thing in Robinson v.

Robinson, 70 Idaho 122,127,212 P.2d 1031, 1033-34 (Idaho 1949). Finally, in McKnightv.
Grant, 13 Idaho 629, 637, 92 P. 989, 990 (Idaho 1907), the Court held that, "We think [Article 5,
Section13] was ... intended to preserve to the judicial department of the state government the
right and power to finally determine controversies between parties involving their rights and
upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or determination made." In
short, this Court has consistently and long held that the legislature may not directly or otherwise
restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) cannot
stand as a bar to reaching the merits of Petitioner's post-conviction petition.

II.

THE TWO CLAIMS WHICH THE LOWER COURT DECLINED TO ALLOW
PETITIONER TO AMEND INTO HIS PETITION WERE VIABLE, NOT
FUTILE.
Respondent argues that even if the court below should have reached the merits of

Petitioner's two proposed amendments, that court's denial of Petitioner's motion should be
affirmed because the amendments' claims are "futile." Brief at 23. Though Respondent never
expressly states what it means by "futile," it does note that this Court has held that, under certain
circumstances, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion to amend. Specifically, "'If the
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amended pleading does not set out a valid claim, ... of if the opposing party has an available
defense such as a statute of limitations, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny
the motion to file the amended complaint."' Brief at 24 (quoting Black Canyon Racquetball v.

First Nat. Bank, 119 Idaho 171,175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991)).
Respondent asserts that the court below did not abuse its discretion in denying
Petitioner's motion because his motion did not meet the Section 19-2719 limitations period.
Petitioner has already examined Respondent's limitations period contention and demonstrated
that it fails. Brief at 24. Thus, this reason fails.
Second, Respondent contends the claims are futile because "Rhoades has provided no
evidence that the state was aware of any opinions contrary to the state's expert's opinion." Brief
at 25. Respondent appears to be arguing that Petitioner's proposed amendments did not allege
sufficient facts to make out his claim that the prosecution knew or should have known that the
FBI testing performed at the prosecution's request excluded Petitioner as a contributor of the
semen removed from the victim. However, this argument ignores and is refuted by Dr.
Hampikian's affidavit filed with the court below and in which he makes clear that there can be no
question that prosecution knew the import of the FBI report because "the kind of analysis I
conducted to arrive at the conclusions I reached in my June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only
universally accepted by forensic biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it also was a basic
tool known to and employed by forensic experts in investigating offenses where evidence
containing body fluids might help uncover a perpetrators identity." R. p.199. Thus, contrary to
Respondent's assertion, Petitioner did make out a prima facie case that the prosecution knew that
its forensic expert's testimony was false.
9

It may be that Respondent means to focus not on what the state's forensic expert knew
but on what the prosecuting attorneys knew. If this is true, then Respondent would presumably
be arguing that Petitioner has failed to proffer any evidence that the prosecuting attorneys knew
that the forensic expert's testimony was false. But if this is Respondent's intended argument, it
fails as well. Prosecuting attorneys are duty-bound "to learn of any favorable evidence known to
the others acting on the government's behalf in the case[.]" Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437
(1995). Thus, either the prosecuting attorneys knew or they should have known that their
forensic expert's testimony was false. Either way, their failure to correct that false and highly
prejudicial testimony violated Petitioner's federal and state constitutional right to due process.
Thus, Petitioner's claims do not fail for lack of evidence that the prosecution was unaware that
their forensic expert's testimony was false.
III.

PETITIONER'S ACTUAL INNOCENCE CLAIMS: FREE-STANDING ACTUAL
INNOCENCE CLAIMS ARE COGNIZABLE AND PETITIONER HAS
CLEARLY MADE OUT A GATEWAY INNOCENCE CLAIM.
Respondent argues that there is no cognizable state or federal free-standing actual

innocence claim for relief. Nor, Respondent contends, does Petitioner meet the actual innocence
claim standard necessary for a court to reach the merits of a previously procedurally defaulted
claims. Both arguments fail.

A.

Federal And State Free-Standing Innocence Claims Are Cognizable.

Respondent correctly notes that the United States Supreme Court has yet to expressly
hold that a freestanding innocence claim exists. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006).
Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, no state or federal government may kill a defendant who is factually
IO

innocent of the offense of conviction, of any aggravating factors necessary to render him eligible
for death, or of any other facts on which the sentencer relied in imposing the penalty of death.
Petitioner contends that the Idaho Constitution forbids the State from killing any similarly
situated prisoner even though this Court has not held that freestanding innocence claims are
cognizable. Idaho Const. article I, § 13.

B. Petitioner Has Made Out A Gateway Claim Of Innocence.
In addition to his free-standing claims of innocence, however, Petitioner claims that he
has made out a state and federal gateway claim of innocence. Gateway claims are claims of
innocence supported by evidence sufficient to compel review of a prisoner's otherwise waived
claims but not to require his release. Hays v. State, 132 Idaho 516, 519-20, 975 P.2d 1181, 118485 (Ct.App. 1999); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). Unlike the petitioner in Hays, Idaho
courts in the case at bar have found Petitioner to have waived a variety of claims that his
conviction and/or sentence were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights -including,
according to the court below, his claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
The United States Supreme Court has recently had occasion to emphasize three features
of Schlup gateway claims. In resolving gateway actual innocence claims, "[t]he court's function
is not to make an independent factual determination about what likely occurred, but rather to
assess the likely impact of the evidence on reasonable jurors." House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537
(2006) (citing to Schlup). Further, "[a] petitioner's burden at the gateway stage is to demonstrate
that more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt --0r, to remove the double negative, that more likely than not any
reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt." Id at 538. Finally, the question is "how
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reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record." Id. at 519.
In the case at bar, the state's evidence was almost exclusively circumstantial. The sole
exception to this was testimony regarding Petitioner's alleged "I did it" station-house statement.
In its direct appeal and initial post-conviction appeal review, this Court found that Petitioner
made his statement in response to the functional equivalent of interrogation. Specifically, he
responded to Officer Shaw's stating that the victims of Petitioner's might still be alive if
Petitioner had been arrested earlier. As this Court uoted,
In this case, based on the record before us, Rhoades did not assert
his right to remain silent. If he had, Shaw's comment, properly
found by the trial court to be "the functional equivalent of
interrogation," would have been improper, and the second
statement would not have been admissible.

Id. at 971. As Petitioner has noted in federal court, this was an unnerving forecast of things to
come. In 1996, Petitioner discovered the facts which, on this Court's view, rendered his stationhouse statements inadmissible. In particular, in a l 996 deposition, Officer Shaw produced a
report he had written in which he states that before stating that victims would still be alive if Mr.
Rhoades had been arrested earlier, he began questioning Mr. Rhoades about the burglary. Rather
than engage, however, Mr. Rhoades responded: "' Aw bullshit, I don't want to talk about it.' Get
these fuckin cuffs off me. "'2 In that deposition, taken nearly ten years after Mr. Rhoades' arrest,
Shaw testified to the following having occurred during the short patrol car ride from the scene of
arrest to the station-house:
Q. Was there a time during your encounter that Mr. Rhoades told
you he didn't want to talk about any particular subject?

2

The extra quotation mark is in the original report.
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A. No. When we were in the car and I started to talk to him about
- I was talking about Lavaunda's Lingerie and only Lavaunda's
Lingerie in the car because I wanted to start chronologically and
get this whole thing - you know, I wanted to start there because
that's where my warrant was. And he said he didn't want to talk
about it, get these handcuffs off of him because it was cramped in
that car, and it was cramped. It was cramped for me and I'm
pretty good sized, too, so I understood that, and so I - when we got
inside I took the handcuffs off and then we, you know, proceeded
to talk... .I assumed he meant right then because of the cramped
condition in the car and that's - and I'm convinced that is exactly
what he meant.

Q. You nonetheless continued to interrogate him at the Wells
stationA. I did, yes.
Q. - about the homicides as well as the Lavaunda's Lingerie
subject, is that right?
A. Yes ...
Shaw Dep. 81-2, Mar. 21, 1996. Shaw was prepared to testify that after arriving at the police
station, he said to Mr. Rhoades that had he arrested him for burglary, three people would have
been alive, and that Mr. Rhoades responded, "I did it."
This Court found that it was "several months" before that second "I did it" was written
into any report. State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho at 73,822 P.2d at 970. And it never made it into a
report from the only person who would most naturally report it, i.e.- Shaw, the sole interrogating
officer at the station-house. Id
And the prosecution emphasized the statements in its closing argument as well;
Here again, it brings us back to the point that's at issue in this case. What
happened is not at issue. Even how it happened to a large degree is not at issue.
The question of who did it is the only issue. When this defendant was arrested in
Nevada he said, "I did it." He said that as the Idaho officers approached.
13

Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 2128 L. 25. After a full page of additional emphasis on Mr. Rhoades' initial "I
did it," the prosecuting attorney asked, "Did he say, 'Hi Dennis, what brings you to Nevada?'
No, he says, 'I did it.' He knows why they're there."
Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 2130 L. 4-6. Then:
Later in that day as he was being photographed by Detective Shaw... , Detective
Shaw laments, he says, "If only I'd arrested you earlier, this victim would be
alive." To which the defendant responds, "Yeah I did it." What did he mean?
You know what he meant. He was admitting to having killed Susan
Michelbacher. Detective Shaw realizing what was occurring, clarifies, says, "The
lady from Idaho Falls?" The defendant reaffirms, "I did it."

Id. In addition to the prosecution's emphasizing the "I did it" statements to the jury, jurors do
not need to be led to place emphasis on confessions. As the Supreme Court has noted,
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, "the defendant's own confession is
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against
him .... The admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most
knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct.
Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may
justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so." Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S., at 139-140 (White, J., dissenting). See also Cruz v.
New York, 481 U.S., at 195 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton).
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,296 (1991).

In determining how reasonable jurors would react to the overall record, including the new
evidence and the evidence which came out at trial, the Court must find that any reasonable juror
would have reasonable doubt as to Petitioner's guilt. It must, therefore, rule that Petitioner has
met the actual innocence gateway claim and allow him to develop in the court below claims
which have earlier been ruled waived.
Finally, Respondent wrongly asserts that Petitioner "refused to disclose the results of the

14

DNA testing that was conducted." Brief at 21. In fact, Petitioner's counsel in the court below
was in close contact with Bonneville County Prosecuting Attorney Dane Watkins throughout the
testing process, and Petitioner's counsel shared with Mr. Watkins the results of the ongoing
testing. Unfortunately, there was insufficient DNA to obtain a full profile.
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